A new type of economy has taken shape in Ukraine — and the most appropriate term for it is Donornomics. In textbooks, an economy is a system of production, distribution, and consumption, which relies on labor, capital, investment, and institutions. There are no shortcuts in this model: reforms, privatization, tax discipline, productivity — all of it is painful and slow. How closely does the current Ukrainian economy correspond to this classical model? In reality, a completely

Is the Debt-to-GDP Ratio an Appropriate Metric for Assessing Debt Sustainability in Wartime? In recent months, one figure has been actively discussed in Ukraine: public debt has exceeded 100% of GDP. For many, this sounds like a psychological threshold — a line beyond which a country is allegedly destined to enter a risk zone. The very fact of crossing this mark is increasingly presented as a self-sufficient argument in debates about Ukraine’s economic future, fiscal policy,

IMF Staff Note on Potential Output Measurement In global practice, the key question is whether a crisis constitutes a temporary shock or a structural shift, as this distinction determines how potential GDP is interpreted. During crisis periods — from the Great Recession to COVID-19 — the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF consistently separated temporary drops in actual output from the long-term trajectory of potential output. This is precisely why, in 2009, the Europe

Out of long-standing habit, I read the NBU’s October Inflation Report. It’s a document I have been following for many years, and always with particular attention. If there is anything stable in Ukraine’s economic policy framework, it is the professionalism of the team that prepares these reports. The people at the NBU do complex, often invisible, but extremely important work. And for that reason alone, their documents deserve far closer attention than the loud political state

I never considered it my field, never wanted to descend to the level of people who, in recent years, have turned the state into an instrument of their personal vendettas. But there are moments when silence becomes complicity. The man who turned the Presidential Office into a private power center, who declared me his enemy, orchestrated criminal cases and a cynical political prosecution, who did everything possible to destroy my reputation and my life — today he is leaving his

Following reports that the IMF is insisting on a hryvnia devaluation as part of negotiations for a new program worth roughly $8 billion (according to Bloomberg/Reuters estimates), the topic has entered the public domain. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) denies any “IMF-driven devaluation,” citing inflation and social risks. Yet the actual exchange-rate dynamics indicate a gradual adjustment: • On 1 October 2025, the official USD/UAH rate stood at ₴41.1420 (NBU). • On 20 Oct

Officially, this measure is temporary, until the first quarter of 2027. In practice — it is the third consecutive extension. For the state budget, it is a quick fix: according to estimates, the government will collect an additional UAH 15–23 billion in 2026. In wartime conditions, that looks tempting. The banking sector remains profitable — with over UAH 150 billion in net profit in 2024 — so the political logic is simple: “take it from those who have it.” From an economic st

Following reports that the IMF is insisting on a hryvnia devaluation as part of negotiations for a new program worth roughly $8 billion (according to Bloomberg/Reuters estimates), the topic has entered the public domain. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) denies any “IMF-driven devaluation,” citing inflation and social risks. Yet the actual exchange-rate dynamics indicate a gradual adjustment: • On 1 October 2025, the official USD/UAH rate stood at ₴41.1420 (NBU).• On 20 Octo

Officially, this measure is temporary, until the first quarter of 2027. In practice — it is the third consecutive extension. For the state budget, it is a quick fix: according to estimates, the government will collect an additional UAH 15–23 billion in 2026. In wartime conditions, that looks tempting. The banking sector remains profitable — with over UAH 150 billion in net profit in 2024 — so the political logic is simple: “take it from those who have it.” From an economic st

While the Ukrainian authorities continue to speak of “macroeconomic stability” and “high reserves,” the country is in fact entering a phase of silent default — quietly, without formal announcement, but with all the characteristic symptoms: growing debt burden, disregard for debt terms, and the absence of a plan B. $665 Million as an Alarm Signal On May 30, 2025, Ukraine officially announced for the first time that it would not pay $665 million on GDP-linked warrants issued du

The global trade model that dominated the post-Cold War era is being quietly but fundamentally rewritten. For decades, the US offered its allies two core advantages – often without asking much in return: 1. a military security umbrella, 2. preferential access to the world’s largest consumer market. These weren’t just political favors – they were massive economic inputs. If you try to quantify them, the picture becomes clear: • For the EU alone, the value of these two advantag

The National Bank of Ukraine has kept its key policy rate at 15.5% per annum, citing a decline in inflation to 13.2% and the persistence of elevated inflation expectations. At first glance, the decision appears to reflect monetary discipline. However, given the current price dynamics, a rate of 15.5% is no longer an effective anti-inflation anchor nor a real stimulus for lending. It plays more of a formal, signaling role, without having a tangible impact on domestic economic

As Ukraine enters autumn 2025, its economy teeters on the brink of a new macroeconomic shock, with its recovery potential exhausted. The low-base effect from 2022, which drove record GDP growth in Q2 2023 (+19.5% year-on-year), has fully dissipated. Economic momentum began to slow by late 2023, and by Q4 2024, the economy had slipped into recession (–0.1% year-on-year). The Economy Before and During the Full-Scale War Before Russia’s invasion in February 2022, Ukraine’s econo